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Author: Robert M. Entman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Telecommunication policy
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Author: Robert M. Entman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Telecommunication policy
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Author: Charles B. Goldfarb
Publisher: Nova Publishers
ISBN: 9781600211331
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 190
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Book Description
In 1996, Congress enacted comprehensive reform of the nation's statutory and regulatory framework for telecommunications by passing the Telecommunications Act, which substantially amended the 1934 Communications Act. The general objective of the 1996 Act was to open up markets to competition by removing unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry. At that time, the industry was characterised by service-specific networks that did not compete with one another: circuit-switched networks provided telephone service and coaxial cable networks provided cable service. The act created distinct regulatory regimes for these service-specific telephone networks and cable networks that included provisions intended to foster competition from new entrants that used network architectures and technologies similar to those of the incumbents. This intramodal competition has proved very limited. But the deployment of digital technologies in these previously distinct networks has led to market convergence and intermodal competition, as telephone, cable, and even wireless networks increasingly are able to offer voice, data, and video services over a single broadband platform. the current market environment, but not on how to modify it. The debate focuses on how to foster investment, innovation, and competition in both the physical broadband network and in the applications that ride over that network while also meeting the many non-economic objectives of U.S. telecommunications policy: universal service, homeland security, public safety, diversity of voices, localism, consumer protection, etc. This book explores these issues and includes the act in its entirety.
Author: Roberto Balmer
Publisher: Roberto Balmer
ISBN: 1495301346
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 154
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Book Description
This book reviews the economic literature on cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks and geographic regulation. It additionally proposes innovative models for estimating the level of competition and investment in the fixed telephony market and the retail market for newspapers. In doing so, it addresses two hotly debated issues in business strategy and economic policy: the determinants of investment and competition and the impacts of innovative investment schemes. The first chapter reviews the literature on new cooperative investment schemes in next generation broadband networks and geographic regulation. The effects on competition, investment and welfare of such schemes crucially depend on the details of the agreements. For instance, in the case of joint-ventures, the manner in which investment costs are shared and internal and external access prices are determined significantly impacts the outcome. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post, and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow for some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility of increasing investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation, in addition to considering geographically segmented access prices. The second chapter assesses entry and competition in local retail markets for newspapers. It builds on the new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) literature to estimate sustainable coverage and competitive effects of entry for Swiss newspaper sellers which sell composite goods (newspapers, food and other goods of daily use). An entry threshold ratio methodology is used, allowing for model estimation even when the range of products under examination is not exactly defined and when price and quantity data are not available. It is found that under duopoly prices the market size of a Commune required for single firm entry is about twice as large as under monopoly prices. A clear and quantifiable trade-off between competition and investment therefore exists. Moreover, it is found that while a second entrant in this market strongly increases competition, further entry doesn’t have a significant additional competitive effect. From a welfare perspective, therefore, it can be stated that “two is enough” to ensure competition in this market. In the third chapter, competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market are assessed. A market model based on a generalised version of the traditional “dominant firm – competitive fringe” model, is developed. Direct estimation of the incumbent’s intertemporal residual demand function is performed by instrumenting the market price with incumbent-specific cost shifting variables, as well as other variables. The concrete estimates show that residual retail demand for voice traffic is highly inelastic. Such a level of elasticity is only compatible with a profit maximising incumbent in the case of largely competitive conduct. It is therefore found that the Swiss incumbent acted largely competitively, and that current regulated telephony retail price caps could not be justified on the basis of a lack of competition.
Author: Robert W. Crandall
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 9780815723103
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 444
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Book Description
Since 1971 competition has begun to replace regulation as a governing force in the telecommunications industry. The breakup of the national telephone monopolies, technological advances, and the worldwide network in telecommunications have brought a revolution in the telecommunications equipment and services industries. These changes have forced legislators and regulators to rethink public policy toward communications. The papers in this book were first presented at a conference organized by Robert Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, pulling together a group of industry professionals and scholars to address the far-reaching implications of the upheaval in the communications industry. The contributors analyze the effects of this increasing competition on standardization, technical innovation, and international rivalry. Changing the Rules offers possible policy options and analyzes their potential effects on the future market structure and the competitive positions of the U.S. computer and communications industries.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Communication and technology
Languages : en
Pages : 340
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Author: Peter G. W. Keen
Publisher: Ballinger Publishing Company
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Author: Marc Bourreau
Publisher: Centre on Regulation in Europe asbl (CERRE)
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Book Description
This CERRE report investigates the benefits and drawbacks of telecom infrastructure sharing. The authors have analysed the practice in 12 European countries* and provide recommendations to fairly and efficiently implement co-investment & network sharing agreements in Europe. The new European Electronic Communications Code introduces new regulatory provisions to stimulate investment in next-generation access networks and help to achieve the Gigabit Society targets for the European Union. One of the key new provisions is co-investment for very-high-capacity networks as an alternative to access remedies. As of today, co-investment agreements for the deployment of fast broadband fixed infrastructures have already been implemented in a few European countries. In France, in urban and suburban areas operators are obliged by existing regulations to open to potential co-investors any new fibre infrastructure that they want to roll out, with different modalities for urban and suburban areas. In Portugal, the regulator has not set up similar obligations, but Vodafone and NOS struck a commercial co-investment deal in 2017 to share dark fibre for around 2.6 million homes. Co-investment agreements have also taken place in Italy, Spain and Switzerland. With the new Code, more co-investment agreements are likely to emerge. In mobile markets, network sharing agreements are also very common, both mandated and voluntary, and can take different forms, ranging from sharing of cell sites to sharing of Radio Access Networks (RANs) and spectrum. The deployment of the new 5G mobile technology makes it necessary for operators to share even more of their infrastructure. From a public policy point of view, allowing for infrastructure sharing – where infrastructure sharing encompasses both co-investment and network sharing – involves trade-offs. For example, infrastructure sharing allows operators to share costs – e.g., costs to upgrade or deploy networks, but also operating costs – which may improve their ability to invest, improve coverage and accelerate roll-out – a clear benefit. But, on the other hand, there is the concern that in certain circumstances infrastructure sharing agreements may harm competition, for example, by reducing infrastructure-based competition, and hence investment incentives, or by facilitating collusion between co-investors. The market context (e.g., the market positions of the partners) is a strong determinant of the potential benefits and costs of an agreement. The implementation details of the agreement also matter. The general objective of this report is to discuss the implementation aspects of infrastructure sharing that may affect the trade-off between the benefits of infrastructure sharing, in terms of faster and wider rollout of high-speed networks in particular, and the potential downsides, in terms of reduced investment incentives or softened market competition. We studied the following Implementation aspects: the operational model adopted for infrastructure sharing, whether to regulate or leave the agreement to the market, the interplay between infrastructure sharing and other regulatory provisions, how to price access by late co-investors, and the specificities of infrastructure sharing agreements with business users. Our analysis shows that from a social point of view, infrastructure sharing has the following potential benefits: 1) Sharing of deployment costs, leading to faster and wider coverage and higher quality; 2) Sharing of operational costs, leading to lower prices; 3) Enhanced competition, benefiting consumers in terms of lower prices; 4) Facilitated entry for third-party operators. In the absence of infrastructure sharing, the counterfactual differs depending on the type of technology (fixed or mobile) and the market context (i.e., the dominance of partners). In the fixed market, with SMP operators, but also under the new co-investment provisions in the EECC, the counterfactual involves some access obligations. For fixed infrastructure sharing with non-SMP operators, where sharing occurs on a voluntary basis, the counterfactual would rather involve no access obligation. In the mobile market, the counterfactual situation would involve no access obligation and most (if not all) nationwide networks investing independently to upgrade their networks. The market context and the type of technology deployed (fixed or mobile) will affect the magnitude of potential benefits and drawbacks. The implementation of an infrastructure sharing agreement will also affect the potential benefits and costs of infrastructure sharing. Therefore, we have analysed how an agreement should be implemented to maximize benefits while minimizing potential costs. Finally, in this report, we discussed the experience in various European countries regarding mobile network sharing and fixed co-investment, with a review of the relevant legal cases when available. The legal cases show that infrastructure sharing agreements are generally viewed favourably by competition authorities as fostering faster network roll-out and increased competition, and that there is not one single form of cooperation that is favoured by competition authorities. The cases show that infrastructure sharing transactions, regardless of the form, must take the following anti-competitive effects into account: - The infrastructure sharing involving new network investment should result in more and faster total network roll-out, or more and faster network upgrades, than would otherwise be the case in the absence of cooperation. - As a general matter, infrastructure sharing with limited geographic scope will create fewer competition concerns than sharing covering large parts of a country; sharing in rural areas will create fewer issues than sharing in urban areas. - Sharing of passive network elements will raise fewer competition issues than sharing active network elements, such as RAN sharing. - The pricing of wholesale inputs (passive and active infrastructure, maintenance services) should be analysed both with regard to their impact on the retail pricing strategy of the parties (the risk of price coordination), but also with regard to access prices charged to third party operators (risk of foreclosure). - Where some party’s incentives are not aligned with its contractual investment or maintenance obligations, there is a significant risk of anticompetitive behaviour regardless of what is written in the contract. Therefore, infrastructure sharing deals should be avoided or carefully scrutinized where there is a mismatch in incentives (for example, if one of the parties already has a cable network in a zone covered by the party’s co-investment commitment). - Restrictions to third party access to infrastructure should be eliminated or reduced to the strict minimum necessary for the infrastructure sharing involving new network investment to be viable. - The competitive impact on third party operators of infrastructure sharing will also depend on the existence or not of regulated wholesale access remedies, as well as in co-investment projects the openness to further co-investors. - Information exchange must be limited to what is strictly necessary, including if necessary the organization of internal Chinese walls.
Author: Thomas James Duesterberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Telecommunication
Languages : en
Pages : 144
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Book Description
According to this book, the anticipated benefits of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are proving elusive, as competiton has been slow to rise, and government agencies have been slow to implement the deregulation and market-opening processes specified in the new law. The authors argue that the pace of innovation and the telecom industry's demonstrated capacity to restructure itself efficiently show that the benefits of competition far outweigh the costs of trying to micromanage the industry through regulation.
Author: Anastassios Gentzoglanis
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1849805245
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 369
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Book Description
After decades of liberalization of the telecommunications industry around the world and technological convergence that allows for increasing competition, sector-specific regulation of telecommunications has been on the decline. As a result, the telecommunications industry stands in the middle of a debate that calls for either a total deregulation of access to broadband infrastructures or a separation of infrastructure from service delivery. This book proposes new approaches to dealing with the current and future issues of regulation of telecommunication markets on both a regional and a global scale. This volume represents a valuable compendium of ideas regarding global trends in the telecommunications industry that focus on market and regulatory issues and company strategies. With an international cast of contributors, Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry also provides insight into topics including: mobile Internet development, structural function and separation, global experiences with next generation networks, technology convergence and the role of regulation, and the regulatory impact on the balance between static and dynamic efficiencies. The empirical evidence and experiences presented here illustrate the diversity of thoughts and research that characterize this important area of academic and business research. Thus, it will be a critical reference for scholars and students of regulatory economics, policy and finance and researchers and administrators of the telecom industry.
Author: James J. Alleman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0585333149
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Book Description
Randall B, Lowe Piper & Marbury, L.L.R The issue of costing and pricing in the telecommunications industry has been hotly debated for the last twenty years. Indeed, we are still wrestling today over the cost of the local exchange for access by interexchange and competitive local ex change carriers, as well as for universal service funding. The U.S. telecommunications world was a simple one before the emergence of competition, comprising only AT&T and independent local exchange carriers. Costs were allocated between intrastate and interstate jurisdictions and then again, between intrastate local and toll. The Bell System then divided those costs among itself (using a process referred to as the division of revenues) and independents (using a process called settlements). Tolls subsidized local calls to keep the politi cians happy, and the firm, as a whole, covered its costs and made a fair return. State regulators, however, lacked the wherewithal to audit this process. Their con cerns centered generally on whether local rates, irrespective of costs, were at a po litically acceptable level. Although federal regulators were better able to determine the reasonableness of the process and the resulting costs, they adopted an approach of "continuous surveillance" where, like the state regulator, the appearance of rea sonableness was what mattered. With the advent of competition, this historical costing predicate had to change. The Bell System, as well as the independents, were suddenly held accountable.
