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Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9789027252050
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 542
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Book Description
What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
ISBN: 9789027252050
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 542
Get Book
Book Description
What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Author: Manuel Bremer
Publisher: Peter Lang
ISBN: 9783631578766
Category : Atomism
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
Conceptual atomism claims that most concepts cannot be decomposed into features, so that the conjunction of the features is equivalent to the concept in question. Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism. Justificationist semantics in its pure form, therefore, has to be wrong. Nevertheless, its epistemological approach to questions of evaluations and semantic rules could still stand. The main question is how conceptual atomism can be combined with some justificationist ideas. This new synthesis centres on the representational theory of mind and 'internalist' semantics, but ties these to ideas which stress the epistemic commitments that accompany successful assertions.
Author: Wayne D. Gray
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317708326
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
This volume features the complete text of the material presented at the Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. As in previous years, the symposium included an interesting mixture of papers on many topics from researchers with diverse backgrounds and different goals, presenting a multifaceted view of cognitive science. The volume includes all papers, posters, and summaries of symposia presented at this leading conference that brings cognitive scientists together. The 2002 meeting dealt with issues of representing and modeling cognitive processes as they appeal to scholars in all subdisciplines that comprise cognitive science: psychology, computer science, neuroscience, linguistics, and philosophy.
Author: Susan Schneider
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262527456
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
A philosophical refashioning of the Language of Thought approach and the related computational theory of mind. The language of thought (LOT) approach to the nature of mind has been highly influential in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind; and yet, as Susan Schneider argues, its philosophical foundations are weak. In this philosophical refashioning of LOT and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), Schneider offers a different framework than has been developed by LOT and CTM's main architect, Jerry Fodor: one that seeks integration with neuroscience, repudiates Fodor's pessimism about the capacity of cognitive science to explain cognition, embraces pragmatism, and advances a different approach to the nature of concepts, mental symbols, and modes of presentation. According to the LOT approach, conceptual thought is determined by the manipulation of mental symbols according to algorithms. Schneider tackles three key problems that have plagued the LOT approach for decades: the computational nature of the central system (the system responsible for higher cognitive function); the nature of symbols; and Frege cases. To address these problems,] Schneider develops a computational theory that is based on the Global Workspace approach; develops a theory of symbols, "the algorithmic view"; and brings her theory of symbols to bear on LOT's account of the causation of thought and behavior. In the course of solving these problems, Schneider shows that LOT must make peace with both computationalism and pragmatism; indeed, the new conception of symbols renders LOT a pragmatist theory. And LOT must turn its focus to cognitive and computational neuroscience for its naturalism to succeed.
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John-Michael Kuczynski
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 734
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Book Description
Papers on the philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. Topics covered include probabilistic causation, the nature of formal truth, the role of language in thought, conceptual atomism, simulated vs. actual intelligence, and the nature of emotion.
Author: Sebastian A. Wagner
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640896572
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Psychology - General, grade: 1,7, University of Derby (Institut für Psychologie), course: Cognitive Psychology, language: English, abstract: In Psychology, many theories and models use process charts resembling circuit diagrams of technical devices. In this account, human behaviour and experience appears to be the result of processes taking place in the 'black box' named cognition. In this context, "computationalism is the view that computation [...] can offer an explanatory basis for cognition" (Davenport, 2008, p.1). The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) has developed on this foundation, attempting to reveal what is inside this 'black box'. In contrast, human consciousness being a part of cognition (Harnad, 1994) seems to be beyond any scientific explanation. This essay will critically discuss the extent to which consciousness poses a problem for the CTM - regarding issues surrounding consciousness as an area of scientific study, the extent to which consciousness is explicable in computational terms, explanations of consciousness, and Dennett's (1991) different account to consciousness. It will be argued that consciousness does pose a major problem for the CTM, especially when it is conceptualised as subjective experience. It will conclude that Cognitive Science should presently focus only on certain aspects of consciousness, called the easy problems.
Author: Jerry A. Fodor
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262561464
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian.
Author: Matteo Colombo
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009192817
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 163
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Book Description
The Computational Theory of Mind says that the mind is a computing system. It has a long history going back to the idea that thought is a kind of computation. Its modern incarnation relies on analogies with contemporary computing technology and the use of computational models. It comes in many versions, some more plausible than others. This Element supports the theory primarily by its contribution to solving the mind-body problem, its ability to explain mental phenomena, and the success of computational modelling and artificial intelligence. To be turned into an adequate theory, it needs to be made compatible with the tractability of cognition, the situatedness and dynamical aspects of the mind, the way the brain works, intentionality, and consciousness.
Author: Steven W. Horst
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781466348134
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 460
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Book Description
The computational theory of mind--the belief that the mind can be likened to a computer and that cognitive states possess the generative and compositional properties of natural languages--has proven enormously influential in recent philosophical studies of cognition. In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient. He refutes its claims and assumptions, particularly the assertion that symbolic representations need not have conventional meaning. Horst goes on to sketch a new methodology for looking at the philosophy of psychology, one that provides a more fruitful way of comparing computational psychology with rival views emerging from connectionism and neuroscience. Original and comprehensive, his book is certain to provoke controversy and stimulate debate.
Author: Roberto G. De Almeida
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019046478X
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 329
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Book Description
What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading to? Leading cognitive scientists-Chomsky, Pylyshyn, Gallistel, and others-examine their own work in relation to one of cognitive science's most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor.
