Bank Competition, Risk and Asset Allocations PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Bank Competition, Risk and Asset Allocations PDF full book. Access full book title Bank Competition, Risk and Asset Allocations by Gianni De Nicoló. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Gianni De Nicoló
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Get Book
Book Description
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
Author: Gianni De Nicoló
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Get Book
Book Description
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
Author: Mr.Gianni De Nicolo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451865570
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 51
Get Book
Book Description
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
Author: Alan Xiaochen Feng
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484364023
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Get Book
Book Description
Bank competition can induce excessive risk taking due to risk shifting. This paper tests this hypothesis using micro-level U.S. mortgage data by exploiting the exogenous variation in local house price volatility. The paper finds that, in response to high expected house price volatility, banks in U.S. counties with a competitive mortgage market lowered lending standards by twice as much as those with concentrated markets between 2000 and 2005. Such risk taking pattern was associated with real economic outcomes during the financial crisis, including higher unemployment rates in local real sectors.
Author: Yener Altunbas
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498318509
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Get Book
Book Description
We examine how bank competition in the run-up to the 2007–2009 crisis affects banks’ systemic risk during the crisis. We then investigate whether this effect is influenced by two key bank characteristics: securitization and bank capital. Using a sample of the largest listed banks from 15 countries, we find that greater market power at the bank level and higher competition at the industry level lead to higher realized systemic risk. The results suggest that the use of securitization exacerbates the effects of market power on the systemic dimension of bank risk, while capitalization partially mitigates its impact.
Author: Alexander F. Tieman
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781451842814
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book
Book Description
In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.
Author: Mr.Tito Cordella
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451851995
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Get Book
Book Description
This paper studies the impact of competition on the determination of interest rates and banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. It finds that lower entry costs foster competition in deposit rate sand reduce banks’ incentives to limit risk exposure. Although higher insurance coverage amplifies this effect, two alternative arrangements (risk-based contributions to the insurance fund and public disclosure of financial information) help to reduce it. Moreover, uninsured but fully informed depositors and risk-based full deposit insurance yield the same equilibrium risk level, which is independent of entry costs. The welfare implications of the different arrangements are also explored.
Author: Ahmad Peivandi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
Get Book
Book Description
We develop a general equilibrium model of competitive banks to examine the optimal design of bank regulation. There is a continuum of equilibria of the unregulated economy that feature varying relative sizes of the financial and real sectors. The unregulated economy underinvests (overinvests) in production when aggregate risk is below (above) a threshold. An efficient allocation is implemented by a range of regulatory policies comprising of capital and liquidity requirements, deposit insurance, and bailouts financed by taxes, but there is a unique regulated equilibrium for a given regulatory policy. Capital and liquidity requirements move in opposing directions; an optimal regulatory policy that features a stricter capital requirement has a looser liquidity requirement. When aggregate risk is low, the efficient allocation can be implemented via deposit insurance and taxation, but capital and liquidity requirements are necessary to ensure a unique regulated equilibrium. When aggregate risk is high, all four regulatory tools are essential components of an optimal regulatory policy. Capital and liquidity requirements that implement efficient regulatory policies do not vary with aggregate risk when it is below a threshold, but become tighter as aggregate risk increases above the threshold. Depositor subsidies via deposit insurance and tax shields are efficient when aggregate risk is low, but inefficient when it is high.
Author: Mr.Gianni De Nicolo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1463927290
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 39
Get Book
Book Description
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy.
Author: Sarah Sanya
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1463948212
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Get Book
Book Description
This paper is an empirical analysis of competitiveness in the banking system of four out of the five East African Community (EAC) countries2. The results show that the degree of competition is low due to a combination of structural and socio-economic factors. By way of preview, the analysis ranks the countries in terms of banking sector competitiveness in the following order: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.
Author: John Raymond LaBrosse
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 0857933825
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 529
Get Book
Book Description
Incisive, authoritative and thoughtful, this important and timely collection of papers exploring the unresolved issues left by the recent global financial turmoil, will undoubtedly shape the policy responses to come. Interdisciplinary in approach and wide-ranging in jurisdictional scope, it draws together influential commentators, practitioners and regulators, to create a new milestone in the search for the fundamentals of a more stable global financial system.? - Eva Lomnicka, King?s College London, UK ?This book contains a large number of chapters, nearly 30 in all, by acknowledged experts on various aspects of the recent financial crisis. Whichever aspect of this crisis that may interest you, such as bank taxes, deposit insurance, TBTF and how to respond, cross-border issues, and many, many others, you will find chapters that are both authoritative and stimulating in this collection. The editors are to be congratulated not only in their selection of authors but also in the speed with which they have taken them from conference presentation to book chapter.? - Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics, UK Managing Risk in the Financial System makes important and timely contributions to our knowledge and understanding of banking law, financial institution restructuring and related considerations, through the production of an innovative, international and interdisciplinary set of contributions which link law and policy issues surrounding systemic risk and crisis management. The recent financial crisis has exposed both the banking industry and financial system safety net players in many countries to a considerable level of distress as well as economic and reputational damage. These circumstances have heightened the need for policymakers to consider remedial measures under a broad umbrella that encompass inter alia prompt corrective actions, early closure of distressed entities, deposit insurance, bail-outs, state-aid, bank resolution and restructuring techniques. These essays provide an important contribution to research in this area, at a crucial time in the debate around the future financial industry. Contributors
